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INTRODUCTION
I came into the world of labor law and, derivatively, fair
employment practice antidiscrimination law, through a
rather roundabout process. As a high school student, I was
inspired by the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling declaring
“separate but equal” unconstitutional in public education in
Brown v. Board of Education, 1 and was convinced by
* Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Emeritus, Stanford Law School;
Chairman of National Labor Relations Board, 1994–1998; Chairman of the
California Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 2014–; Member of the National
Academy of Arbitrators since 1970; Consultant to the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 1966–1967. The author is grateful to Eric Weitz,
Stanford Law School ‘14, for the valuable research provided in connection with
the preparation of this article. Erika Wayne and her first-rate Stanford Law
Library team have been extraordinarily helpful as well. Of course, any errors or
deficiencies are the author’s own. This Article is based upon a speech delivered
on January 24, 2014, at Stanford Law School, at the Stanford Law ReviewStanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Symposium: The Civil
Rights Act at Fifty (Jan. 24–25, 2014).
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Thurgood Marshall’s success that a lawyer could produce real
change in American society. Four years later, my first-year
Constitutional Law course deepened my interest by
examining what the NAACP had accomplished through
litigation prior to Brown, particularly in the 1930s and
1940s, 2 as well as some of its progeny. 3 Twenty years after
Brown, I had this to say:
[Brown] gave me and other blacks the hope and belief that
the law could address itself to racial injustices in this
country and that I as a lawyer could make some
contribution to end the old order against which my
parents had struggled. In their day the struggle was
against hopeless odds—hopeless because all who
possessed African blood were isolated, ridiculed,
despised—and thus regarded as unfit for occupations and
work that the white man was willing to perform. . . .
Brown was important to all black people because it gave
us hope that we would have our day in court—both
literally and figuratively. 4

2. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948);
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373
(1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).
3. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); see also
HARRY KALVEN JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965). Later I
was able to rely on this line of authority in Washington. See Novotel N.Y., 321
N.L.R.B. 624 (1996); Shepherd Tissue, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 369, 373 (1998)
(Gould, Chairman, concurring).
4. 120 CONG. REC. 16,229–30 (daily ed. May 22, 1974); Conversations with
Earl Warren, STAN. LAW., Summer 1974, at 9. For a somewhat different
perspective, see generally MICHAEL KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2007).
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Though I followed assiduously the debate 5 on the Civil
Rights Act of 1957—the first civil rights legislation enacted
since Reconstruction—and subsequently the Civil Rights Act
of 1960, my growing realization that inequities in the
workplace were a vital part of this struggle drove my career
towards labor law. 6 My experience in this field provided me
with an early exposure to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and led to my involvement with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission at its inception. 7
I have always believed that labor law is a critically
important prerequisite to employment discrimination law
because of certain common characteristics shared by the
National Labor Relations Act and Title VII, the former
influencing the latter thirty years later. In the first place, the
concept of unlawful employment practices in Title VII closely

5. I observed at the time that President Eisenhower expressed relative
indifference or lack of knowledge about his own proposed bill:
Q. Mr. Reston: Mr. President, in light of that, would you be willing to
see the bill written so that it specifically dealt with the question of
right to vote rather than implementing the Supreme Court decision on
the integration of schools?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I would not want to answer this in detail,
because I was reading part of that bill this morning, and there were
certain phrases I didn’t completely understand. So, before I made any
more remarks on that, I would want to talk to the Attorney General
and see exactly what they do mean.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, News Conference (July 3, 1957), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10828
[hereinafter
Eisenhower News Conference]. General Eisenhower had earlier testified
against President Truman’s desegregation of the armed forces in 1948.
Universal Military Training: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services,
80th Cong. 986–1013 (1948) (statement of Dwight D. Eisenhower, General of
the U.S. Army).
6. See William B. Gould IV, Recollections of Kurt Hanslowe—A Dedication
to Professor Kurt Löwus Hanslowe, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 925, 929 (1984). My
initial Labor Law course was taken with Professor Bertram Willcox at Cornell
Law School, but my first year paper on Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1959), in Legal Research brought
me to Professor Hanslowe’s attention. He recommended me to the United
Automobile Workers in Detroit in 1960, where I was employed as a law clerk
that summer, and subsequently as Assistant General Counsel in 1961–1962.
7. This took place in the form of being a consultant to the EEOC on
seniority issues under collective bargaining agreements, and drafting a report
dealing with this subject while acting as a Conciliator in Title VII cases in
1966–1967, two of the first three years of Title VII and the EEOC.
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resembles unfair labor practices in the NLRA. Second, both
statutes create an expert administrative agency—the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)—though, as
noted below, they possess different enforcement roles. Third,
the litigation that has emerged about how discrimination is
proved under the NLRA 8 and Title VII 9 contain analytical
similarities.
Finally, both statutes contain provisions
relating to remedies that, as the Supreme Court has noted,
are nearly identical. 10
Like the National Labor Relations Act, 11 the Supreme
Court has interpreted Title VII to permit a finding of
discrimination without intent as a prerequisite, in the
landmark Griggs v. Duke Power holding, 12 which provided a
disparate impact model for antidiscrimination law. But some
members of the Court in recent years have begun to express
skepticism about this precedent. 13 Whatever the numerous
difficulties with Title VII today (below I allude to an
inhospitable judiciary, particularly at the trial level, as well
as
regrettable
Supreme
Court
interpretations
of
antidiscrimination law involving the compatibility of
collective bargaining seniority contract provisions with Title
VII, and other issues), its influence has been substantial and
enduring. It was the first such national law of its kind in the
industrialized world, its enactment predating legislative
8. See e.g., NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983); cf. Frick
Paper Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 9, 12 (1995) (Gould, Chairman, concurring).
9. For example, for the disparate treatment cases, see St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792 (1973). The disparate impact principle is contained in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and subsequently appeared in cases such as Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009); and University of Texas Southwestern
Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
10. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848–49
(2001).
11. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Radio Officers v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
12. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For its application to
sex-discrimination prohibitions, see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977).
13. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); id. at 594 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 596 (Alito, J., concurring).
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initiatives in the United Kingdom, 14 and the Continent of
Europe, 15 which looked at the American experience before
they addressed some of the same issues. Its basic tenets have
stretched out to newer legislation on age, 16 disability, 17 and
sexual orientation 18 discrimination, and have impacted the
law governing sexual harassment 19 and wrongful discharge. 20
Here I discuss: (1) the background of antidiscrimination
law; (2) the debate about the best administrative and judicial
processes to handle antidiscrimination complaints; (3) the
dispute arising out of the relationship between seniority and
the law; (4) the emergence of front pay as a remedy for future
compensation losses suffered by the victims of discrimination;
and (5) the substantial changes in attitude by plaintiffs and
defendants toward jury trials. I conclude by celebrating the
role of the law in reducing discrimination, and yet I express
14. Race Relations Act, 1965, c. 73 (U.K.); Race Relations Act, 1968, c. 71
(U.K.); cf. William B. Gould, No Coloured Need Apply, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 22,
1968, at 14.
15. See Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law:
Employment Cases in the United States and the European Union, 35 YALE J.
INT’L L. 115 (2010).
16. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.
(1967); see George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of
Employment Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491 (1995). Recent
research has helped contradict the notion that older individuals remaining in
the workforce limits job opportunities for younger workers, and instead suggests
that the opposite may be true. See Alicia H. Munnell & April Yanyuan Wu,
Issue in brief, Are Aging Baby Boomers Squeezing Young Workers Out of Jobs?,
CTR. FOR RET. RES.OF BOS. COLL., No. 12-18, Oct. 2012.
17. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.
(1990).
18. See Jeremy W. Peters, Bill Advances to Outlaw Discrimination Against
Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2013, at A10 (discussing proposed federal legislation,
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act). On the state-level, twenty-one states
and the District of Columbia have adopted laws prohibiting discrimination in
the workplace on the basis of sexual orientation. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A
PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 390 (5th ed. 2013).
19. Of course, Title VII has subsumed the law against sexual harassment.
See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17 (1993). The Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hearings in 1991 highlighted
the lack of effective remedies for sexual harassment, which Congress
subsequently created in the form of compensatory and punitive damages as part
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See GOULD, supra note 18, at 393; William B.
Gould IV, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at 14.
20. E.g., Phillips v. St. Mary Reg'l Med. Ctr., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770, 781 (Ct.
App. 2002) (relying on Title VII as source of public policy for wrongful discharge
claim); cf. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (noting
that Title VII does not preempt or supplant state law causes of action).
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caution and concern about the persistence of racist attitudes
expressed sometimes by political leaders and those closely
affiliated with them.
I. THE HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
The struggle for equal employment opportunity in the
past century has its roots in A. Philip Randolph and his
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. 21 As the trade union
movement continued to grow after both the National Labor
Relations Act and the Great Depression, 22 Randolph and the
Brotherhood cried out about black workers being left behind
and began the March on Washington Movement. 23 As the
clouds of World War II were on the horizon, requiring both
labor unity and universal commitment to the war effort,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt is purported to have told Mr.
Randolph that Randolph needed to “make him” act. 24 When
Randolph did so through a threatened march on Washington,
D.C., in 1941, FDR fashioned Executive Order 8802
prohibiting racial discrimination by those who contracted
with the federal government. 25 Twenty years later, the
Order’s substantive reach was expanded by virtue of
President John F. Kennedy’s Executive Order 10925, issued
on March 6, 1961. 26 Kennedy’s Executive Order extended the
obligations of contractors and subcontractors beyond a mere
non-discrimination requirement so as to fashion an obligation
to undertake “affirmative action” to recruit and promote
21. See generally JERVIS ANDERSON, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH; A BIOGRAPHICAL
PORTRAIT (1st ed. 1973).
22. See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS; A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933–1941 (1970).
23. See WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS: JOB
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1977). See generally HERBERT R.
NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO (1944). Long a vocal critic of
the labor movement on race-related issues, in later years Randolph adopted a
more conciliatory stance. See GOULD, supra, at 285; see also W.B. Gould, Race
and the Unions: The Negro and Organized Labor by Ray Marshall, NEW
LEADER, July 5, 1965, at 20–21; William B. Gould, Discrimination and the
Unions, 14 DISSENT 564 (1967); William B. Gould, Discrimination and the
Unions, in POVERTY: VIEWS FROM THE LEFT (Jeremy Larner & Irving Howe
eds., 1968).
24. See 155 CONG. REC. H14,894-95 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2009) (statement of
Rep. John Conyers).
25. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938–1943).
26. Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 443 (1959–1963).
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minority group workers—a duty which now arises
independent of any finding of discrimination. 27 Once the
Johnson administration took office, 28 the Department of
Labor was given responsibility for the Order though its Office
of Contract Compliance—but it was not until 1971, under
Richard Nixon, 29 that the federal government began to
enforce these Orders by disbarring or cancelling the contract
of an employer who failed to adequately recruit minority
group workers. 30
But this was not the only backdrop to Title VII prior to
its enactment. As early as 1945, Northern states began to
enact state fair-employment practice legislation, which later
emerged as a contentious issue during the debates on Title
VII. 31 Perhaps even more important was the development of
litigation that established an implied duty of fair
representation, first under the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and
subsequently through the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) of 1935. 32 In the lead case, Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad, 33 white unions had attempted to remove
27. Id.
28. The Johnson administration’s policy relating to inequality was broader
than Title VII, consisting of a “war on poverty.” See Annie Lowrey, 50 Years
Later, War on Poverty is a Mixed Bag, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2014, at 1. See
generally ROBERT CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: THE PASSAGE OF
POWER (2012).
29. This coincided with the Nixon administration’s aggressive stance
against construction unions in the Philadelphia Plan and its progeny. See
GOULD, supra note 23, at 101–02; see also William Gould, Moving the HardHats In, NATION, Jan. 8, 1973, at 41; William B. Gould, Blacks and the General
Lockout, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1971, at 23.
30. Much of the preceding paragraph is taken from GOULD, supra note 23,
at 33.
31. See generally PAUL H. NORGREN & SAMUEL E. HILL, TOWARD FAIR
EMPLOYMENT (1964); Paul H. Norgren, Government Contracts and Fair
Employment Practices, 29 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (1964). Twenty-two states
enacted fair-employment practices laws prior to 1964: New York and New
Jersey (1945); Massachusetts (1946); Connecticut (1947); New Mexico, Oregon,
Rhode Island, and Washington (1949); Alaska (1953); Michigan, Minnesota, and
Pennsylvania (1955); Colorado and Wisconsin (1957); California and Ohio
(1959); Delaware (1960); Illinois, Kansas, and Missouri (1961); Hawaii and
Indiana (1963). In addition, employment discrimination was made a
misdemeanor in Idaho (1961), Iowa (1963), and Vermont (1963). William M.
Landes, The Effect of State Fair Employment Laws on the Economic Position of
Nonwhites, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 578, 578 n.1 (1967).
32. Syres v. Oil Workers Int’l Union, Local No. 23, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.
1955), rev’d, 350 U.S. 943 (1955).
33. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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black workers from the railways, particularly as the advent of
the diesel engine converted the black fireman’s job away from
something that was dirty and unpleasant into featherbedded
work that was easy if not nonexistent. In Steele, the Court
held that unions operating as exclusive bargaining agents for
all employees in an appropriate unit must represent them
fairly, without hostility or discrimination. 34 The Court, albeit
utilizing constitutional analysis that has since been
abandoned, 35 assumed that if Congress could be deemed to
have bestowed broad bargaining authority upon unions which
engaged in hostile action toward blacks, they would have, in
effect, sanctioned the practice of racial discrimination, thus
The Court,
producing grave constitutional questions. 36
however, found an implied statutory duty of fair
representation and thus avoided the constitutional issues. 37
Steele emphasized that a strike was the minority’s only
recourse when an exclusive representative of the majority
ignored minority interests, and that resort to such self-help
contravened the statutory objective of achieving industrial
peace. 38 There were limitations in Steele, not the least of
34. See id. at 204.
35. Id. at 198–99 (“[If] the Act confers this power on the bargaining
representative of a craft or class of employees without any commensurate
statutory duty toward its members, constitutional questions arise. . . . But we
think that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act and authorizing a labor
union . . . to represent the craft, did not intended to confer plenary power upon
the union to sacrifice . . . rights of the minority in the craft, without imposing on
it any duty to protect the minority.”); cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972). In this period, the Court also began to retreat from federal
constitutional protection. Compare Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), with Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972). See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); cf.
Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992);
Fashion Valley Mall LLC v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742 (Cal. 2007); Ralph’s Grocery
Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 290 P.3d 1116 (Cal.
2012).
36. Justice Murphy accepted this view in his concurrence. Steele, 323 U.S.
at 209 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“[T]his constitutional issue cannot be lightly
dismissed. The cloak of racism surrounding the actions of the Brotherhood in
refusing membership to Negroes and in entering into and enforcing agreements
discriminating against them, all under the guise of Congressional authority,
still remains. No statutory interpretation can erase this ugly example of
economic cruelty against colored citizens of the United States.”).
37. Id. at 202–03.
38. Id. at 200 (“[Industrial peace] would hardly be attained if a substantial
minority of the craft were denied the right to have their interests considered at
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which was the Court’s dicta that unions could exclude anyone
from membership, 39 a conclusion confirmed subsequently by
Though the
appellate authority at the federal level. 40
National Labor Relations Board administratively remedied
this in some respects on the very day that Title VII was
enacted in 1964, 41 Steele and its progeny 42 required expensive
and sometimes torturous litigation in courts of general
jurisdiction, rather than an expedited administrative process.
Although the Supreme Court was to subsequently hold that
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had prohibited racial
discrimination in employment, 43 that issue was only to
emerge as a significant matter much later. 44
Thus, to recapitulate, though Title VII broke new ground,
it had genuine antecedents. The first of them was the
executive orders beginning in 1941. Second came the Steele
decision, establishing a duty of fair representation for unions
acting as exclusive bargaining representatives and, in so
doing, highlighting the gaps that could be plugged in only
the conference table and if the final result of the bargaining process were to be
the sacrifice of the interests of the minority by the action of a representative
chosen by the majority. The only recourse of the minority would be to strike,
with the attendant interruption of commerce, which the Act seeks to avoid.”).
39. Id. at 204 (“While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor
organization the right to determine eligibility to its membership, it does require
the union, in collective bargaining and in making contracts with the carrier, to
represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without hostile
discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.”).
40. Oliphant v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359,
363 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959). But see Betts v. Easley,
169 P.2d 831 (Kan. 1946); James v. Marinship Corp. 155 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1944).
41. Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). This analysis was derived
from Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962). See also Miranda Fuel
Co., Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 454 (1959), enforced, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 284
F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1960); Local 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic
Workers of America v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966); Richardson v. Texas
& New Orleans R.R. Co., 242 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1957); Cent. of Georgia Ry. v.
Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956). See generally William B. Gould IV, Labor
Law and the Negro, NEW LEADER, Oct. 12, 1964, at 10. The Board had taken
the position since 1945 that unions which discriminate on the basis of race could
not use the National Labor Relations Act’s representation procedures, but
refused to equate segregation with discrimination per se. See Larus & Bro. Co.,
62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
42. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Syres v. Oil Workers
Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
43. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); see also Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
44. E.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987); see also
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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through legislation. Third came legislation itself in the form
of state fair-employment practices statutes just as World War
II came to an end.
II. TITLE VII AND THE DEBATE SURROUNDING ITS PASSAGE
Although proposals for fair employment legislation had
been made as early as 1948 under President Harry S.
Truman, it would take more than a decade before the political
climate demanded action. The early 1960s was a dangerous
collision course of civil rights demonstrations, hoses, police
dogs, and “Bull” Connor’s insistence that the South truly
meant it when it said “Never” to integration of the races. As
sit-ins and “freedom rider” demonstrations unfolded in the
early 1960s, 45 by the summer of 1963 policymakers began to
engage in a serious discussion about civil rights legislation
relating to employment. It was June 1963 when President
Kennedy proposed legislation in the wake of the
demonstrations in Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, and
said: “Who among us would be content to have the color of his
skin changed, and stand in his place? Who among us would
then be content with the counsels of patience and delay?” 46
Both prior and subsequent to the debate about detailed
civil rights legislation, the 1960s also saw many workers’
strikes and slowdowns unauthorized by unions, known as
wildcat work stoppages, with a variety of civil rights
demands. 47 Demonstrations taking place in major cities such
as San Francisco, 48 Seattle, 49 Detroit, 50 Chicago, 51 and
45. See ANTHONY LEWIS, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE: THE SECOND AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1964); William B. Gould IV, Review: Portrait of a Decade by
Anthony Lewis, COMMONWEAL, Mar. 12, 1965, at 767. See generally TAYLOR
BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63 (1989);
TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1963–65 (1999);
TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965–68
(2007)
46. LEWIS, supra note 45, at 193; see also GOULD, supra note 23, at 15.
Much of the preceding paragraph and subsequent paragraphs is taken from the
same.
47. See William B. Gould IV, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact Upon
Collective Bargaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969); cf. NLRB v. Tanner
Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965); Emporium Capwell Co. v. W.
Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
48. E.g., Carl Nolte, Sit-In at Hotel Sparked City’s Civil Rights Era, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 1, 2014, at A1; Hotel Emp’rs Ass’n, 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966); cf.
Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. 50.
49. William B. Gould, The Seattle Building Trades Order: The First
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Pittsburgh, 52 sometimes led to agreements and controversies
in arbitration about them. 53
But notwithstanding President Eisenhower’s previously
expressed reservations about the suitability of law to address
race-relations disputes, 54 the consensus amongst those who
sought change was that law was critical in breaking down
racial inequality and necessary to promote fairness. As the
demand for legislation grew, one of the first areas of debate
involved the structure through which rights could be
adjudicated and remedies enforced. Civil rights proponents
assumed the model of the National Labor Relations Act and
the National Labor Relations Board was the ideal. 55 When
Comprehensive Relief Against Employment Discrimination in the Construction
Industry, 26 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1974).
50. See GOULD, supra note 23, at 180, 274, 388–93 (discussing the Dodge
Revolutionary Union Movement in Detroit).
51. GOULD, supra note 23, at 303–09.
52. Id. at 309.
53. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974); 14 Penn Plaza v.
Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); William B. Gould IV, Labor Arbitration of
Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969);
William B. Gould IV, A Half Century of the Steelworkers Trilogy: Fifty Years of
Ironies Squared, in ARBITRATION 2010: THE STEELWORKERS TRILOGY AT 50:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS (Paul D. Staudohar & Mark I. Lurie eds., 2011); David Gregory &
Edward McNamara, Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims, and the
Future of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 429 (2010). Some special arbitration procedures reflecting Title VII
standards were placed in collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Basic
Vegetable Prods., Inc., 64 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 60 (1975) (Gould, Arb.);
Weyerhauser Co., 78 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1109 (1982) (Gould, Arb.).
54. At a 1957 press conference, commenting on Governor Orval Faubus’s
use of the Arkansas National Guard to prevent black students from integrating
Little Rock’s Central High School, President Eisenhower criticized “these people
who believe you are going to reform the human heart by law,” and spoke of
“strong emotions” on the other side, and of “people that see a picture of the
mongrelization of the race. . . . We are going to whip this thing in the long run
by Americans being true to themselves, and not merely by law.” Robert Shogan,
Book Mark: Is Eisenhower to Blame for Civil Rights Explosion?, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 25, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-24/opinion/op-1214_1_
eisenhower-civil-rights; see also President Dwight D. Eisenhower, News
Conference (Oct. 30, 1957), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb
.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10943 (“We just simply cannot solve [the problem]
completely just by fiat or law and force. This is a deeper human problem than
that.”); President Dwight D. Eisenhower, News Conference (Sept. 3, 1957),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10877 (“[T]ime and again
. . . [I] have argued that you cannot change people’s hearts merely by laws.”);
see supra note 5.
55. See David Freeman Engstrom, The Lost Origins of American Fair
Employment Law: Regulatory Choice and the Making of Modern Civil Rights:
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President Truman initially advocated for fair employment
practices legislation—proposals propounded as a plank in the
1948 Democratic Party platform but never able to overcome
filibusters in 1949—the proposals provided cease-and-desist
authority to a newly created administrative agency. 56 Under
such an approach, hearings conducted before administrative
law judges, appealable to both the agency itself as well as the
courts, would nonetheless produce compliance in many cases
before the process was exhausted. Thus, a path toward
redress presided over by an expert agency would be relatively
expeditious, and informal and economical as well. Because
this was viewed to be superior to time-consuming and
relatively expensive litigation in unsympathetic and inexpert
courts of general jurisdiction, liberal supporters of civil rights
legislation rallied in support of this approach. 57
The
underlying
assumption
was
that
these
administrative procedures, while ultimately providing for and
relying upon enforcement by the courts when a responding
party resisted the agency’s cease-and-desist order, 58 would be
self-enforcing in many instances, and would provide relatively
easy access for parties that found the judicial process timeconsuming and expensive (laypeople can represent
themselves as well as parties before the Board 59). Under the
National Labor Relations Act itself, parties that file unfair
labor practices charges have free counsel with the Board’s
General Counsel bearing the expense of prosecution
throughout the administrative process, 60 a feature hardly
insignificant for both impecunious and average income
workers. On the other hand, civil rights proponents were
always concerned with another feature of the NLRA
administrative process, i.e., under the Act, the General
Counsel has near-plenary authority to screen out what are
deemed to be non-meritorious charges by refusing to issue a
1943–1972, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1081–84 (2011).
56. E.g., The Text of President Truman’s Message on Civil Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 1948, at 22 (advocating for the creation of a permanent Fair
Employment Practice Commission with substantive authority to prevent
employment discrimination).
57. Cf. Engstrom, supra note 55, at 1085–86.
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (2006).
59. See NLRB, RULES AND REGULATIONS—PART 102 § 102.38, at 16,
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/rules-regulations.
60. Cf. United Auto. Workers Local 283 v. NLRB, 382 U.S. 205 (1965).
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complaint. 61 This framework posed, then and now, potential
harm to blacks, minorities, and women who had been
excluded from decision-making for so long.
Although adopted by a House Judiciary Subcommittee,
the NLRA cease-and-desist authority was not included within
the legislative package that emerged from the House
Judiciary Committee. Instead, the Committee gave the new
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authority to
bring suits in federal court challenging employment
discrimination. 62 This provision passed the House but stalled
in the Senate as a result of the Republican-Southern
Democrat filibuster threat, which had provided for the burial
of fair employment practice legislation ever since the 1948
campaign. Out of this impasse came negotiations between
Senator Hubert Humphrey and the conservatives, and the
Dirksen-Mansfield amendments to the statute, which had the
effect of lifting the filibuster threat in the spring of 1964. 63
The Dirksen-Mansfield amendments to Title VII were a
compromise that preserved the state role of enforcement by
requiring a complaining party to take a charge to the state
The
agency before proceeding to the EEOC itself. 64
amendments contradicted the NLRA policy, which ousted
state jurisdiction wherever the NLRA could apply. 65 Thus,
tensions with state labor relations boards have been
historically minimized by virtue of the doctrine of preemption,
through which their authority is constitutionally sidelined. 66
On the other hand, state fair employment practices
commissions had existed for some period of time and were
thought, by emphasizing conciliation, to facilitate “soft
settlements” that did little to remedy discrimination because
of the fact that settlements were frequently negotiated

61. E.g., NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers Local 23, 484 U.S. 112
(1987); United Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966).
62. This information can be found in GOULD, supra note 23, at 39.
63. See TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO
PRESIDENTS, TWO PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
(2014).
64. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
65. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
66. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959). Cf. Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S.
714 (1963) (finding that state anti-discrimination law was not preempted by
federal law).
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without a full investigation and factual support. 67
Although the Dirksen-Manfield amendments were
essential in the passage of Title VII, in the process the role of
the EEOC was altered so as to provide it with little-to-no
independent enforcement capability. The authority of the
new five-member Commission was to investigate, find
reasonable cause or no reasonable cause to believe that
discrimination was taking place, and attempt to conciliate.
The Commission had no authority to alter behavior in any
other way, and could not issue orders or, as the House had
initially provided, proceed to court. Thus, the Commission
was, in Professor Michael Sovern’s words, “a poor, enfeebled
thing.” 68 The second Chairman of the Commission (FDR Jr.
was the first), Stephen Schulman, colorfully described the
EEOC’s enforcement role in 1967: “We’re out to kill an
elephant with a fly gun.” 69
The EEOC, however, was not entirely toothless. The
process of issuing reasonable cause findings carried with it a
role comparable to that of the NLRB in connection with the
writing of decisions and formulation of legal rationale, and
thus ultimately led to formulating key positions in such
issues as seniority, testing, sex discrimination, maternity
leave, and state protective laws. 70 In the early days of the
statute, particularly in 1965-1966, the EEOC’s decisions and
guidelines established much of the framework for federal
court decisions that flowed from litigation. Moreover, the
Commission played an important role in dramatizing
discrimination by holding public hearings, a practice engaged
in by both Chairman Clifford Alexander and, particularly,
Chairman William H. Brown III. This brought them criticism
from Senators McClellan and Dirksen for putting undue
pressure on business and labor. 71
As a result of the EEOC’s limited enforcement authority,
and although the 1964 legislation did give the Attorney
67. See GOULD, supra note 23, at 39. The New York fair-employment
commission in particular played a noteworthy role. Id.
68. MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT 205 (1966); see also GOULD, supra note 23, at 39.
69. James P. Gannon, Uphill Bias Fight: After Faltering Start, Agency
Readies Attack on Job Discrimination, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1967, at 1.
70. GOULD, supra note 23, at 40.
71. Much of the preceding paragraph is taken from GOULD, supra note 23,
at 40.
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General authority to institute suits where there was a
“pattern or practice” of discrimination, 72 the majority of the
burden of enforcement fell in the hands of individuals
authorized by the legislation to sue as private-party plaintiffs.
This became a most important avenue for civil rights
enforcement, as the Supreme Court deemed a plaintiff not to
be acting “for himself alone” but rather as a “private attorney
general” who puts on “the mantle of the sovereign” in the
public interest. 73 This led the courts to take the view that
discrimination claims, though initiated by an employee for
whom “past due wages may be tiny,” could warrant a “full
scale inquiry” into employment practices that would
otherwise go unremedied because of a divide-and-conquer or
“resist-and-withdraw” technique. 74 Class actions filed under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were utilized
considerably, 75 although ultimately circumscribed in this
century. 76
III. 1972 AMENDMENTS TO TITLE VII: A SECOND LOOK AT
EEOC ENFORCEMENT
When Congress had the second crack at employment
discrimination law in 1972 through new amendments to Title
VII, a debate quite different from that of 1964 emerged. The
Nixon administration then favored EEOC court actions
rather than cease-and-desist authority of the type that the
NLRB possessed. Liberals favored the latter, and the debate
assumed a liberal-versus-conservative divide. But at this
point, and in the years to come, the question of which of the
two alternatives would be more effective by no means
provided a clear-cut answer. 77
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (2012).
73. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (Title
II); Jenkins v. United Gas Co., 400 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1968) (Title VII);
GOULD, supra note 23, at 53 & n.2.
74. Jenkins, 400 F.2d at 33.
75. E.g., Huff v. N.D. Cass Co. of Alabama, 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973).
76. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). But see Dustin
Massie, Too Soon for Employers to Celebrate? How Plaintiffs Are Prevailing
Post-Dukes, 29 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 117 (2013).
77. See, e.g., Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1972, at M-32 (“Superficially,
the cease-and-desist route holds out the promise of swifter action and more
uniform administration of the law, but experience with N.L.R.B. hearing
examiners suggests that they do not dispose of cases more rapidly than Federal
district judges. As for the uniformity of interpretation, the harder issues will
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One argument, relied upon by the EEOC courtenforcement proponents, is that a principal consideration in
creating the NLRB and its special expertise was the lack of
understanding and hostility of federal courts of general
jurisdiction. This level of judicial hostility simply did not
apply to Title VII case in the early stages of the statute,
particularly in the 1960s and early-to-mid-1970s. Today, if
one examines the posture of the Supreme Court in
antidiscrimination cases, 78 the pendulum seems to have
swung back the other way. 79 This, along with similar
hostility on the part of the judiciary, 80 undercuts some of the
only be settled by appeal to the Supreme Court whether they originate in
E.E.O.C. orders or in district court law suits.”); see GOULD, supra note 23, at 41.
78. E.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013); Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013). The Court’s holding in Shelby
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), though a voting case not involving
employment, vividly illustrates how far the Court has retreated from the tenor
of both the Brown and Griggs holdings. See generally William B. Gould IV, The
Supreme Court, Job Discrimination, Affirmative Action, Globalization, and
Class Actions: Justice Ginsburg’s Term, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. (forthcoming May
2014). Even prior to recent developments, the Court’s hostility to Title VII and
employment discrimination law manifested itself in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); and Martin v. Wilks,
490 U.S. 755 (1989). These decisions induced Congress to overrule the Court in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amendments. See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, The
Law and Politics of Race: The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 44 LAB. L.J. 323 (1993);
Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 287 (1993); Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921 (1993); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis of the Congressional Response
to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923 (1993); Daniel F. Piar,
The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 2001 BYU. L. REV. 305 (2001).
79. See generally Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and
Floodgates, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2014); Suja A. Thomas, Why
Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007); Suja A.
Thomas, Judicial Modesty and the Jury, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2005); Suja A.
Thomas, Re-Examining the Constitutionality of Remittitur Under the Seventh
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (2003); see also Amanda Farahany & Tanya
McAdams, Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims for Cases (Sept. 16,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2326697, in which an Order was
Issued on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in 2011 and 2012 in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
80. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 103, 104–05 (2008) (“[C]ases proceed and terminate less favorably
for plaintiffs than other kinds of cases. Plaintiffs who appeal their losses or face
appeal of their victories again fare remarkably poorly in the circuit courts. The
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EEOC court-enforcement arguments.
Yet problems abound with the NLRB cease-and-desist
approach. In the first place, though not very apparent at the
time of the 1972 amendments debate, the problem of
administrative inefficiency and delay is a feature that has
made remedies a major element of the labor law reform
debate, as well as proposals to streamline the administrative
process. 81 Second, beyond the problems with the NLRB itself,
however, its relative speediness was put forward as an
argument favoring the administrative process. This, of
course, was all before the advent of jury trials, which have
begun to dominate Title VII proceedings—a phenomenon
which makes the judicial process longer. 82
Third, the NLRB primary jurisdiction and preemption
approaches seem ill suited to antidiscrimination law, where
individuals would be precluded from having their day in court
by virtue of the Board’s unwillingness to move forward and
issue a complaint through the Regional Director or General
Counsel. Closely tied to this problem is the sharp swings in
the NLRB’s willingness to enforce the law, 83 with
appointments of temporary duration, 84 the most recent
example illustration being that of the Bush Board in the early

fear of judicial bias at both the lower and the appellate court levels may be
discouraging potential employment discrimination plaintiffs from seeking relief
in the federal courts.”); id. at 119 (“[E]mployment discrimination plaintiffs or,
more realistically, their lawyers are becoming discouraged with their chances in
federal court.”); id. at 131–32 (“Today employment discrimination plaintiffs still
must swim against a strong tide—in the federal district court and on appeal. . . .
[D]efendants in the federal courts of appeals have managed over the years to
reverse forty-one percent of their trial losses in employment discrimination
cases, while plaintiffs manage only a nine percent reversal rate. The most
startling change in the last few years’ data is the substantial drop of almost
forty percent in the number of employment discrimination cases in the federal
district courts.”).
81. Administration of the Labor-Management Relations Act by the NLRB:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Labor Relations Board of the H.
Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong. (1961) (Pucinski Committee
report).
82. See discussion, infra Part VI.
83. See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS AND
THE NLRB—A MEMOIR (2000).
84. Clyde W. Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 93 (1954); W. Willard Wirtz, New National Labor Relations Board:
Herein of “Employer Persuasion,” 49 NW. U. L. REV. 594 (1954); cf. William B.
Gould IV, Crippling the Right to Organize, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at A25.
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part of this century. 85 Will minority interests fare well in this
model? Notwithstanding labor’s precipitous decline in recent
decades, 86 for better or worse, both labor and management
are able to influence the policy administration of labor law
depending on which party is in power. 87 This is not as likely
to be true where civil rights organizations, like the NAACP,
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
(MALDEF), or the National Organization for Women (NOW),
are the parties affected. They may not have the same
institutional presence or staying power as labor and
management under the NLRA.
Finally, one of the problems with NLRB remedies is the
fact that its contempt procedures are so ill suited to the
statutory framework, given the fact that enforcement of the
Board’s orders is generally obtained in the circuit courts of
appeals and that the appellate process is not accustomed to
dealing with contempt problems. 88 A major virtue of the
EEOC enforcement avenue is to be found in the fact that
courts of general jurisdiction (which preside over both EEOC
and private-party actions) are particularly concerned with the
integrity of and compliance with their own entered orders.
Obviously, the appellate courts, taking appeals from the
administrative law judges and NLRB decisions, do not have
the same institutional vested interest and stake in seeing the
85. See GOULD, supra note 18, at ix–x, 246–47 (discussing the Bush Board’s
so-called “September Massacre of 2007”). This problem culminated in New
Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S., 674 (2010), where a quorum was found to
be lacking, and in the new constitutional recess appointment issue, see NLRB v.
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 490 (2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2861 (2013).
86. See generally SOLOMON BARKIN, THE DECLINE OF THE LABOR
MOVEMENT: AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (1961); A.H. Raskin, The Big
Squeeze on Labor Unions, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1979, at 41; A.H. Raskin,
The Squeeze on the Unions, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1961, at 55; PAUL
JACOBS, THE STATE OF THE UNIONS (1963); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR
REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW (1993).
This has now begun to affect the public sector. See Joseph E. Slater, PublicSector Labor in the Age of Obama, 87 IND. L.J. 189 (2012); Kenneth Glenn DauSchmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget Shortfalls,
the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the
United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407 (2012); Steven Greenhouse,
Wisconsin’s Legacy for Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2014, at 1, 4.
87. See William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process,
and the State of Labor-Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor
Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461 (2007).
88. See Florian Bartosic & Ian D. Lanoff, Escalating the Struggle Against
Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1972).

GOULD FINAL

2014]

5/23/2014 12:43 PM

TITLE VII AT FIFTY

387

order enforced. Contempt sanctions aimed at recidivists will
not be as effective at the appellate level.
IV. COMPATIBILITY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SENIORITY
PROVISIONS WITH TITLE VII
A second debate in the early days of Title VII arose from
disputes about seniority provisions adopted by unions and
employers in negotiated collective bargaining agreements.
Although provisions in collective bargaining agreements were
far more important in the 1960s than now in 2014 given the
dramatic decline in the trade union movement, 89 and
although resolved in some major respects, these disputes
continue to have a bearing upon much of the contemporary
litigation, and involved substantive law rather than the
procedural framework discussed above.
At least three important issues were involved in
litigation about the relationship between seniority provisions
and discrimination under Title VII. The first was the
recognition of the disparate impact approach by the Supreme
Court in its seminal decision Griggs v. Duke Power. 90 In
interpreting Title VII, the Court’s disparate impact approach
recognized that intentional discrimination was not a
prerequisite to show a violation and establish consequent
liability. 91 Specific intent to discriminate was generally
absent in the seniority cases—the proof of this point was to be
found in the fact that identical seniority systems could in one
context create Title VII liability, but in another context create
no liability where blacks or other discriminatees were not
part of the relevant labor market. A seniority system might
exist and be lawful in a remote part of North Dakota or
Montana where no blacks were present, and yet the identical
language could create liability in Alabama. The key in Griggs
was disparate impact, i.e., did the seniority system retard or
exclude blacks in the workplace just as effectively as the
written examinations and educational requirements did in
Griggs?
89. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Membership (Jan. 24,
2014), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.toc.htm.
90. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
91. Cf. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375
(1982) (holding that a showing of intentional discrimination was required to
establish liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1866).

GOULD FINAL

388

5/23/2014 12:43 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

Second, unions had argued that any discriminatory
practices flowing from seniority were attributable to employer
discriminatory hiring policies.
These practices made it
impossible or more difficult for black workers to accumulate
the necessary seniority credits to compete effectively for the
better-paying jobs where departmental or job-classification
seniority was established by the collective bargaining
agreement. Thus, those workers pushed into the lessdesirable jobs by discriminatory hiring and no-transfer
policies could not use their seniority in bidding for the better
ones because they had been unable to acquire the requisite
and relevant seniority credits during the years of hiring and
transfer discrimination.
Third, the relationship between past discrimination prior
to the effective date of the statute, July 2, 1965, and
prospective practices was in play as well. As Judge John
Wisdom of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
“[O]ne of the most perplexing issues troubling the courts
under Title VII [was] how to reconcile equal employment
opportunity today with seniority expectations based on
yesterday’s built-in racial discrimination.” 92
All three of these seniority issues were particularly
contentious given the fact that Senator Lester Hill of
Alabama (which by virtue of its steel plants in Birmingham
was more unionized than most of the Deep South)
campaigned against the proposed law in 1963-1964 by
arguing that blacks would take away the seniority of whites
under fair-employment legislation. The AFL-CIO, supporters
of the legislation, sought to assure union members that the
proposed legislation would not interfere with their seniority
However, the definition of discrimination and
rights. 93
unlawful conduct under Title VII was broad, and Senators
Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania and Clifford Case of New
Jersey attempted to address the tensions between seniority
and discrimination while putting together a so-called ClarkCase memorandum in consultation with the Department of
92. Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 982 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); GOULD, supra note 23, at 19 &
n.10.
93. See AFL-CIO, CIVIL RIGHTS: FACT VS. FICTION (1964). Much of the
information from this paragraph can be found in GOULD, supra note 23, at 68–
70.
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Justice. This position, put forward as a rebuttal to Senator
Hill, stated, in part, that “last hired—first fired seniority”
would not be affected by Title VII. Out of this debate
emerged subsequently the so-called “bona fide seniority”
proviso, which deemed seniority rules to be immune from
Title VII unless they were “the result of an intention to
discriminate.” 94
The Clark-Case memorandum appeared weeks before the
seniority proviso emerged as part of the Dirksen-Mansfield
amendments. But the ambiguity of the legislative history
was made no more unambiguous by the proviso, i.e., the
question of what was discriminatory or nondiscriminatory
relating to departmental seniority systems and disputes
between incumbent workers was not explicitly addressed.
The only issue that seemed to be resolved clearly was
that Title VII could not be interpreted to permit unemployed
black workers to oust incumbent white employees by virtue of
a “fictional” seniority predicated upon the period of initial
exclusion, i.e., the amount of time that they had been barred
from the enterprise by hiring discrimination. The bona fide
seniority proviso contained in section 703(h) was aimed at
this problem—but no other, especially given the expansive
prohibition against discrimination contained in the statute.
Thus, seniority that would have been acquired but for
discrimination in this context would not be recognized—it
would be viewed as a fiction unless specific individuals
evidenced their discriminatory exclusion from a firm on an
individual basis.
The fact that the hiring color bar was removed did not
permit an unemployed black worker to come off the streets
seeking new employment opportunities by removing current
white employees from positions that might have been
obtained due to previously discriminatory practices. But this
hypothetical was dramatically different from the problems
that emerged in the early days of Title VII, i.e., disputes
about the use of seniority when blacks attempted to move out
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2012) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are not the result of
an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . .”).
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of previously segregated jobs into which they had been hired
(it was clear that hiring into such categories exclusively was
now unlawful), and the use of seniority to obtain access to
more-desirable jobs and to use such in progressing further up
lines of progression inside better-paying departments or job
classifications. Here, seniority, while not rooted in contract, 95
was less fictional for statutory purposes given the fact that
blacks (and sometime Latinos or women) were identifiable 96
as victims of discrimination in that they had actually been
hired into the jobs and been employed at the enterprise—and
they had been barred from the better-paying jobs by
prohibitions against transfers to them, which froze their
consequent inability to accumulate relevant seniority for the
good jobs under a system that did not recognize seniority
acquired in the low-paying, less-desirable departments or job
classifications.
Prior to Title VII, Judge Wisdom, speaking for the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Whitfield v. United
Steelworkers, 97 had said of a collective bargaining agreement
denying seniority credits for black workers, which
nonetheless opened up transfers to better paying jobs in the
future:
The Union and the Company made a fresh start for the
future. We might not agree with every provision, but they
have a contract that from now on is free from any
discrimination based on race. Angels could do no more.
It is undeniable that negroes in Line Number 2, ambitious
to advance themselves to skilled jobs, are at a
disadvantage compared with white incumbents in Line
Number 1. This is a product of the past. We cannot turn
back the clock. Unfair treatment to their detriment in the
past gives the plaintiffs no claim now to be paid back by
unfair treatment in their favor. We have to decide this

95. See William B. Gould IV, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The
Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 HOWARD L.J. 1 (1967);
William B. Gould IV, Seniority and the Black Workers—Reflections on Quarles
and Its Implications, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1969); George Cooper & Richard B.
Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598
(1969).
96. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
97. 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
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case on the contract before and its fairness to all. 98

I advised the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 99 after acting as a Conciliator in seniority
disputes in South Carolina and Alabama, that Title VII
provided for prospective relief for advancing black workers
previously locked into low-level segregated jobs and that
Whitfield was bad law, at least under Title VII—a position
accepted by every circuit court of appeals in the country,
including opinions by Judge Wisdom himself! 100 Indeed,
Congress itself approved these decisions in the committee
reports leading to the 1972 amendments. 101 But the Supreme
Court, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 102 was to the contrary, stating that Congress at this
juncture could not affirm its understanding of what the
previous body had done in 1964. 103 International Brotherhood
of Teamsters involved low-paid local city freight drivers who
were unable to catch up while bidding for long-distance, over98. Id. at 551. The contractual practices in Whitfield were challenged under
the duty of fair representation initially established in Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
99. See generally Gould, supra note 95. My 1967 article was, in essence, the
report that I had done for the Commission that same year.
100. Justice Marshall had it right in this respect in dissent: “Without a single
dissent, six Courts of Appeals have so held in over 30 cases, and two other
Courts of Appeals have indicated their agreement, also without dissent. In an
unbroken line of cases, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has
reached the same conclusion. And the overwhelming weight of scholarly
opinion is in accord.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
378–80 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
101. S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 5 & n.1 (1971); H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 8 & n.2
(1971); see Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 391–93 (Marshall, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part). But see Justice Marshall’s pronouncement on behalf of a
unanimous Court the following year: “Congress is presumed to be aware of an
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); see also id. at 581 (“So too, where, as here, Congress
adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can
be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the
incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.”). Indeed,
Congress strengthened the remedial provisions of Title VII when it was
amended in 1972. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
102. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
103. Id. at 354 n.39 (“[T]he section of Title VII that we construe here,
§ 703(h), was enacted in 1964, not 1972. The views of members of a later
Congress, concerning different sections of Title VII, enacted after this litigation
was commenced, are entitled to little if any weight. It is the intent of the
Congress that enacted § 703(h) in 1964, unmistakable in this case, that
controls.”).
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the-road line jobs. Although there was no dispute that this
inability was caused by a seniority system in which local
drivers had been unable to accumulate seniority due to
discriminatory hiring, Justice Stewart, speaking for the court,
held that Title VII offered no remedy:
Were it not for § 703(h), the seniority system in this case
would seem to fall under the Griggs rationale. The heart
of the system is its allocation of the choicest jobs, the
greatest protection against layoffs, and other advantages
to those employees who have been line drivers for the
longest time. Where, because of the employer’s prior
intentional discrimination, the line drivers with the
longest tenure are, without exception, white, the
advantages of the seniority system flow disproportionately
to them and away from Negro and Spanish-surnamed
employees who might by now have enjoyed those
advantages had not the employer discriminated before the
passage of the Act. This disproportionate distribution of
advantages does, in a very real sense, “operate to ‘freeze’
the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.” But both the literal terms of § 703(h) and the
legislative history of Title VII demonstrate that Congress
considered this very effect of many seniority systems and
extended a measure of immunity to them. 104

It seems clear that the Clark-Case memorandum did not
focus upon the departmental classification seniority issue of
the early days of Title VII. Nonetheless, the Court majority
stated that:
[T]he unmistakable purpose of § 703(h) was to make clear
that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system
would not be unlawful under Title VII. As the legislative
history shows, this was the intended result even where
the employer’s pre-Act discrimination resulted in whites
having greater existing seniority rights than Negroes.
Although a seniority system inevitably tends to
perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimination in such
cases, the congressional judgment was that Title VII
should not outlaw the use of existing seniority lists and
thereby destroy or water down the vested seniority rights
of employees simply because their employer had engaged
in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act. . . . [W]e
hold that an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority
104. Id. at 349–50.
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system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply
because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. . . .
That conclusion is inescapable even in a case, such as this
one, where the pre-Act discriminatees are incumbent
employees who accumulated seniority in other bargaining
units. Although there seems to be no explicit reference in
the legislative history to pre-Act discriminatees already
employed in less desirable jobs, there can be no rational
basis for distinguishing their claims from those of persons
initially denied any job but hired later with less seniority
than they might have had in the absence of the pre-Act
discrimination. . . .
It would be as contrary to that
mandate to forbid the exercise of seniority rights with
respect to discriminatees who held inferior jobs as with
respect to later hired minority employees who previously
were denied any job. If anything, the latter group is the
more disadvantaged. 105

But Justice Marshall, dissenting with Justice Brennan, 106
had it right in this regard. His persuasive dissent noted that
section 703(h) carved out “an exemption from [ ] broad
prohibitions.” 107 The dissent found the seniority proviso
inapplicable. Moreover, the dissent noted that the proviso
was focused on the attempt to exercise truly so-called
“fictional” seniority, i.e., seniority that would have been
accumulated by minority-group workers as they sought to
obtain any kind of access to more desirable, better paying jobs
rather than the transfers sought when no-promotion or
transfer of policies had previously denied them the ability to
accumulate requisite seniority credits. Second, the dissent
relied upon the above-referenced 1972 amendments, in which
Congress has explicitly placed its imprimatur on the circuit
court case law in its reports. The dissent thus castigated the
Court’s grant of “immunity” to this kind of seniority system.
But in major respects, the genesis of what was adopted
by the dissent, as well as the circuit courts, lives on in major
cases since then. In the early 1970s, prior to Teamsters, the
courts began to award front pay for future compensation
105. Id. at 352–55 (emphasis added).
106. See generally William B. Gould IV, The Supreme Court’s Labor and
Employment Docket in the 1980 Term: Justice Brennan’s Term, 53 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1 (1981).
107. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 381 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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losses in Title VII seniority cases, inasmuch as, even with the
award of prospective seniority, the black workers affected
could not be made whole given the fact that the job they
might have been qualified for and entitled to was presently
held by white workers. What was at issue was the right of
black workers to use seniority credits when vacancies arose—
not in connection with jobs that were currently being held by
employees not subject to discriminatory policies. Accordingly,
the idea of front pay was to compensate for earnings and
other benefits lost in the interim, as the victim of
discrimination made his or her way up the ladder. A
unanimous Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas,
subsequently assumed the propriety of front pay under Title
VII (without explaining all of the circumstances under which
it is an appropriate remedy) and found it to be equitable relief
under the statute rather than an element of compensatory
damages under the 1991 amendments subject to that
provision’s statutory cap on such damages. 108 Though some of
the judicially-crafted front pay awards preceded the 1972
amendments, 109 the Court noted that Congress expanded the
remedies previously listed to include “any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate” and that courts had
subsequently endorsed a broad view of front pay. 110
Thus, though Teamsters has made the issue of front pay
in seniority disputes a moot point because of its
interpretation of the proviso—an erroneous one in my view—
the issue of compensation where equitable relief is not
appropriate at the time of the award remains very much alive
in other employment circumstances both in and outside the
Title VII context. This has been acknowledged in labor
arbitration cases where, for instance, the collective
bargaining agreement has been violated procedurally111 or
108. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001).
109. United States v. Ga. Power Co., Civil No. 12355, 1971 WL 162 (N.D. Ga.
June 30, 1971); cf. Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 121–22 (E.D.
Mich. 1973), rev’d in part on other grounds, EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515
F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975). The author was lead counsel for plaintiffs in the
Stamps case. See William Wong, Lawyer William Gould Prods Courts to End
Job Bias; His Activism Sometimes Irks Peers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1974, at 3.
110. See, e.g., Patterson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 269 (4th Cir.
1976); EEOC v. Enter. Ass’n Steamfitters, 542 F.2d 579, 590 (2d Cir. 1976);
Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 538 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
111. E.g., Safeway Stores, Inc., 64 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 563 (1974) (Gould,
Arb.).
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substantively, but where reinstatement is not an appropriate
remedy. Front pay compensation, however, is admittedly
rare in labor arbitration because neither labor nor
management are generally attracted to this kind of
compromise. 112 Now, as the Court has said, front pay may be
appropriate in such circumstances in lieu of reinstatement
where, for instance, there is “continuing hostility” between
the parties or where the employee has suffered “psychological
injuries.” 113 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, enacted three years after Title VII and amended in
1986 so as to eliminate in virtually all circumstances
mandatory retirement, has seen the award of front pay
utilized even more frequently where the employee is
estimated to be near retirement. 114
Again, the Supreme Court has said that front pay is
appropriate in lieu of reinstatement, and has said that the
Civil Rights Act authorizes those awards where they are
Ironically,
made
“in
lieu
of
reinstatement.” 115
notwithstanding the importance of reinstatement particularly
under statutes like the National Labor Relations Act where
the remedy is central to its orders, a substantial number if
not the overwhelming percentage of settlements obtained
under that Act (and in arbitration proceedings as well)
provide for compensation without reinstatement. In contrast
to antidiscrimination law, 116 the NLRA does not contain the
authority to fashion punitive relief. 117 But this does not affect
112. On the other hand, reinstatement without back pay remains another
form of compromise, and where the collective bargaining agreement has been
violated but the employee does not have clean hands seems to be well accepted.
113. Pollard, 532 U.S. at 853.
114. See, e.g., Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.
2000); Davis v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 923 (6th Cir. 1984); Goss
v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984); cf. Donlin v. Phillips
Lighting N. Am. Corp. 581 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 2009); Meacham v. Knolls
Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56, 79 (2d Cir. 2004); Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe R.R. Co., 65 F.3d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1995); Hukkanen v. Int’l Union of
Operating Eng’rs, 3 F.3d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1993); Proctor v. Consol.
Freightways Corp., 942 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1991).
115. Pollard, 532 U.S. at 846.
116. Cf. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999); Johnson v. Ry.
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
117. See Republic Steel Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); NLRB v. Seven-Up
Bottling, 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953); Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961); H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970);
GOULD, supra note 18, at 230.
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front pay, and thus the General Counsel has properly
concluded that Board settlements (as well as non-Board
settlements where they were previously permissible) may
include front pay along with reinstatement and thus
constitute compensation rather than a penalty. Accordingly,
the Board, this past year, in part relying upon Supreme Court
Title VII authority, held that even though front pay is not a
remedy which the Board includes in its remedial orders, the
General Counsel nonetheless “may approve as part of a
voluntary settlement . . . seek informal proceedings.” 118 The
General Counsel has said that where front pay “in lieu of
reinstatement is proposed, the offer should be communicated.
In addition, a Region may raise the issue of front pay if the
Region is confident that reinstatement will not be achieved
absent litigation.” 119 But the approach of the Board has thus
far been that front pay will not be sought in formal
proceedings—in contrast to the position of the EEOC under
Title VII and related antidiscrimination law. 120 Nonetheless,
perhaps, through the influence of the subsequently enacted
antidiscrimination law (a kind of role reversal), in future
years this will change.
V. JURY TRIALS
The posture of the federal courts toward Title VII today
is appreciably different than it was in the 1960s when the
federal courts were viewed to be overly sympathetic to Title
VII plaintiffs. 121 The jury trial debate at the time of the
passage of Title VII is the mirror image of this shift and one
which is predicated upon the hostility of juries to plaintiffs.
At the time of Title VII, it was feared that juror bias
would undermine the effectiveness of the statute and thus
undercut civil rights. In part, this was foreshadowed by the
debate relating to the Civil Rights Act of 1957, when the jury
118. Memorandum from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, N.L.R.B. on
Subject: Inclusion of Front Pay in Board Settlements to all Division Heads,
Regional Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers, 2013 WL 154207,
at *1 (N.L.R.B.G.C. Jan. 9, 2013).
119. Id. at *2.
120. See Chairman Clarence Thomas, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm. on
Policy Guidance: A Determination of the Appropriateness of Front Pay as a
Remedy Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),
1988 WL 912194, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Guidance Oct. 25, 1988).
121. See supra note 80.
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trial became a key element of debate, sometimes viewed as a
labor versus conservative issue. The positions in the debate,
like the one involving administrative process, have been
turned on its head over the past half-century.
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 was the first piece of civil
rights legislation seriously considered and ultimately enacted
since Reconstruction. It almost foundered on the jury trial
issue, i.e., whether a jury would be provided in contempt
cases arising out of disobedience of court decrees providing for
black voter eligibility.
The concern was that,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding that
discrimination against jurors was unconstitutional in 1880, 122
juries, particularly in the South, were simply too hostile to
enforce civil rights. 123 Ultimately, the Jury Trial Amendment
in 1957 would pass with then-Senator Kennedy casting his
vote with the South, perhaps in anticipation of the 1960
presidential election. 124
The same considerations animated the Title VII debate,
leaving unresolved congressional intent with regard to the
jury trial issue. Because Congress did not expressly provide
for a jury trial in Title VII, it was left to the courts to
determine if the right was provided implicitly, or was
constitutionally mandated by the Seventh Amendment’s
preservation of the right to a jury trial in civil cases. In
Curtin v. Loether, where compensatory and punitive damages
were awarded under Title VIII’s prohibitions on racial
housing discrimination, the Court in dicta noted that the
Seventh Amendment was not presumed to be applicable to
the NLRA, or “in administrative proceedings, where jury
trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of
administrative adjudication and would substantially interfere
122. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
123. Anthony Lewis, Senate’s Rights Bill: How It Would Operate, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 1957, at 147; William S. White, Johnson Charges Nixon Distortion in
Rights Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1957, at 1; Civil Rights—Reactions to the
Jury Trial Amendment and the Key Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1957, at E1;
Stevenson on Jury Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1957, at 32; The Nation—
Southern Jury Trial, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1957, at 136.
124. Washington Wire—Democrats and Dixie, NEW REPUBLIC, July 15, 1957,
at 2 (“We find ourselves a little uncomfortable over Presidential aspirant John
Kennedy’s flirtation with Southern politicians.”); see also Stevenson on Jury
Trial, supra note 123, at 32; The Nation—Southern Jury Trial, supra note 123,
at 136. In a receiving line for Senator Kennedy at that time, I queried him
about his jury trial position, and he responded thoughtfully.
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with the NLRB’s role in the statutory scheme.” 125 In the
same case, the Court spoke approvingly of lower court
decisions holding that a jury trial was not required in an
action for reinstatement and back pay. The Court assumed
that a jury trial was not applicable to cases involving
equitable relief such as reinstatement, and also held back pay
to be incidental to the equitable relief under both the NLRA
and Title VII. Said the Court: “Whatever may be the merit of
the ‘equitable’ characterization in Title VII cases, there is
surely no basis for characterizing the award of compensatory
and punitive damages here as equitable relief.” 126
Accordingly, in such cases a jury trial is mandated.
But the Court’s reasons for denying a jury trial,
particularly where policy-makers were concerned with juror
bias, seemed to be undermined for a number of reasons in the
1970s and 1980s. 127 Foremost amongst the new developments
was the advent of common-law wrongful discharge actions in
the 1980s, fueled in substantial part by jury trials, where
plaintiffs relied upon juries to assess substantial damages,
both punitive and compensatory, against defendantemployers perceived to possess deep pockets. 128 Plaintiffs
now saw juries as worker-friendly, and corporations grew to
fear them. Ultimately, Congress, dissatisfied with numerous
Supreme Court decisions in the late-1980s, enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which provided for punitive and
compensatory damages, and thus more use of jury trials. 129
All of this has meant that fears of juror bias in race cases
have been submerged by the employer-employee divide
regarding jury trials, spurred initially by the wrongfuldischarge actions.
Plaintiffs were not in the least bit concerned. Indeed,
they welcomed this development:

125. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). Here the Court referenced
its own landmark holding in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937), where the NLRA was held to be constitutional.
126. Loether, 415 U.S. at 197.
127. See Kerry R. Lewis, Note, A Reexamination of the Constitutional Right
to a Jury Trial Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 TULSA L.J.
571, 579–80 (1991).
128. See William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A
Case for Arbitration, 13 EMP. REL. L.J. 404 (1988).
129. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001).

GOULD FINAL

2014]

5/23/2014 12:43 PM

TITLE VII AT FIFTY

399

In employment discrimination cases, the annual number
of jury trials has increased. . . . In non-jobs [civil rights
cases involving discrimination], over the twenty-eight-year
period the ratio went from under two out of five to over
three out of five. The ratio in jobs cases much more
dramatically increased: in 1979, only about one in ten
trials was a jury trial; by 2006, jury trials were about nine
in ten. Compared to other plaintiffs, jobs plaintiffs prefer
jury trial to judge trial. 130

This is because the win rate for plaintiffs is
“substantially worse in judge trials than in jury trials. In
numbers, employment discrimination plaintiffs have won only
19.62% of judge trials. While employment discrimination
plaintiffs have thus won fewer than one in five of their judge
trials, other plaintiffs have won 45.53% of their judge
trials.” 131 It is difficult to know why this is so, though the
above-noted proclivity of juries to be unsympathetic to those
with deep pockets cannot be dismissed. Equally important,
the judiciary itself appears less receptive to Title VII claims.
In any event, this development constitutes one of the sharpest
contrasts between the law and assumptions about protection
under it today as compared to fifty years ago when the
statute was first enacted.
CONCLUSION
The developments to Title VII since 1964 are
considerable. The professions, as well as supervisory and
employment ranks, are more integrated. There is more
contact between the races. 132
The administrative process debate seems to have been
turned on its head, in large part due to developments under
both the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII. Even
through seniority litigation, where the Court engaged in a
contorted assessment of Title VII legislative history to deny
plaintiff claims, front pay has emerged as an additional and
important remedy.

130. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 80, at 125–26.
131. Id. at 130.
132. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) “Virginia is now one of 16
states which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of racial
classifications.” Id. at 6.
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Though the Supreme Court and the lower courts under it
have become increasingly unsympathetic to plaintiffs seeking
redress under employment discrimination law, juries, made
available by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
amendments providing for compensatory and punitive
damages, have provided plaintiffs with something of a life
raft. The jury trial debate has been turned on its head. The
common law wrongful discharge actions which emerged in the
1980s have made the jury an institution that can occasionally
cabin judicial hostility.
Progress in the war against discrimination has been
made over the half-century, notwithstanding more societal
inequality. A black candidate for President has been elected
twice, albeit with a minority of the white vote. The world is
different and in some respects better in 2014 as compared to
1964.
But there are many who do not subscribe to
antidiscrimination law. 133 The challenge remains in the next
half-century to unfold.
What then can or should be done next in the struggle to
diminish racial considerations 134 in a truly post-racial
society—and yet simultaneously tackle the societal and
economic inequities recognized in both Brown and Griggs?
Surely policies designed to reduce inequity 135 should also in
133. For example, even the Republican candidate for governor of Texas
endorsed musician Ted Nugent after the latter called President Obama a
“communist-nurtured subhuman mongrel.” Manny Fernandez, Candidate for
Texas Governor Stands by Outspoken Musician, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2014, at
A10; see also, e.g., Igor Volsky, South Dakota Lawmaker Says Businesses
Should Be Able to Turn Away African-Americans, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 17,
2014), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2014/03/17/3413901/south-dakota-lawmaker
-says-businesses-should-be-able-to-turn-away-african-americans.
134. The Supreme Court has never found an affirmative action program that
it liked. Cf. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557 (2009); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267
(1986); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). But see,
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); cf. Local 93, Int’l Ass’n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). See also, in particular,
Justice Ginsburg’s dissents in Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2432 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting), and Ricci, 557 U.S. at 608 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135. They will have to be considerable and comprehensive. See, e.g., Eduardo
Porter, A Relentless Widening of Disparity in Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2014, at B1. Adhoc Committee on Termination at Will and Wrongful Discharge,
Labor & Employment Law Section, State Bar of California, To Strike a New
Balance, reprinted in LABOR & EMP. L. NEWS (SPECIAL EDITION) 1 (Feb. 8,
1984), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/
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all probability reduce racial divisiveness. 136 The same holds
true regarding legislation or policy protecting workers from
all arbitrary treatment in the workplace. 137 Race, sex,
national origin, religion, and the other grounds upon which
discrimination is currently prohibited should not be the only
basis for protection in the employment relationship. For,
after all, the current system induces non-meritorious
complaints about discrimination (because they are virtually
the only complaints which can be entertained outside a
collective bargaining agreement), which are meritorious
considered against a standard of fairness.
These steps are important prerequisites toward a road
leading to a post-racial era in which administrative agencies
and the judiciary focus upon arbitrary treatment under a
standard where all consideration of arbitrary matters like
race is itself arbitrary. In 2014, that day is still a distant one.

259017/doc/slspublic/gould_strikeanewbalance.pdf (I was co-chairman of the
Committee which authored this report addressing wrongful discharge actions,
jury trials, and arbitration).
136. Cf. United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB,
416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
137. See William B. Gould IV, The Idea of Jobs as Property in Contemporary
America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU L. REV.
885 (1986).

